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FULL TRANSPARENCY: A CASE AGAINST THE
COLLECTION OF INTERNET INFORMATION IN
TRUMP-ERA AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
Thomas P. Campbell*
ABSTRACT
The Department of Homeland Security recently posted a Notice in the
Federal Register informing of an update to the immigrant tracking database
known as the “Alien Files.” The Notice stated that the A-Files database will
now store: “social media handles, aliases, associated identifiable information,
and [internet] search results.” On October 28, 2017, the policy change
outlined in the Notice went into effect. This Comment critically analyzes the
new DHS policy, while considering the various legal, social, and practical
concerns associated with this policy. This is a case against the DHS’s
collection and storage of immigrant social media information.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 18, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
posted a notice in the Federal Register (the “Notice”) explaining a change in
the Alien Files (“A-Files”) system.1 The Notice states that, effective October
18, 2017, a new A-Files system will collect, monitor, and store the social
media activity of individuals who are subject to the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”).2 This policy would cover lawful permanent
residents (“LPRs”), Naturalized United States Citizens, individuals
petitioning for INA benefits, legal guardians of the disabled, and any other
persons subject to the vast provisions of the INA.3 The DHS intends to store
“social media handles, aliases, associated identifiable information, and
search results” in its updated A-Files system.4
On October 18, 2017, the customary 30-day comment period officially
ended, and the policy specified in the Notice went into effect.5 During the
comment period, 2,994 public comments were submitted.6 The vast majority
of these comments were submitted by individuals offering scathing critiques
of the new DHS policy.7 These comments varied in tone, some offered by
esteemed law professors, others offered by worried (and often enraged)
private citizens.8 Some of the more compelling comments will be highlighted
here.
Criticisms were not limited to this axiomatic “comment section.” United
States Representative Ted Lieu spoke out against the new policy and

1 See Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,556 (proposed Sept. 18, 2017)
[hereinafter DHS Notice].
2

Id. at 43,556–57.

3

Id. at 43,559.

4

Id. at 43,557, 43,560.

5

Id. at 43,556.

See DHS/USCIS-001 Alien File, Index, and National File Tracking System of Records,
REGULATIONS.GOV,
https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=50&so=DESC&sb=postedDate&po=0&dct=PS&D=D
HS-2017-0038 (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
6

7

See id.

Compare Comment Submitted by Catherine Martinez, Members of the Yale Law School
Community, REGULATIONS.GOV (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DHS-20170038-2986 [hereinafter Comment by Catherine Martinez], with Megan Hughes, Comment Submitted by
Megan Hughes, REGULATIONS.GOV (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DHS2017-0038-2994.
8
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addressed a letter to then-acting United States Secretary of Homeland
Security, Elaine Duke.9 Representative Lieu began by explaining that he is a
naturalized citizen who has lived in the United States for over four decades.10
Representative Lieu worriedly stated that he was “deeply concerned” that the
proposed rule would apply to United States citizens such as himself.11 He
even demanded that the DHS provide further details and clarifications, as
related to some of the more ambiguous provisions in the Notice.12 To date,
these clarifications have not been provided.
Critics and skeptics do have a legitimate reason to be worried. At the
moment, the United States is one of the largest consumers of social media in
the world.13 Social media usage in the United States is at an all-time high.14
According to Statista, 81% of the United States population currently utilizes
social media.15 Unsurprisingly, this number is even higher among young
Americans.16 Statista estimates that 86% of young adults (ages 18–29) utilize
social media.17 Because social media is so heavily relied upon in the United
States, the new DHS policy can impact a myriad citizens and noncitizens
alike.
In wake of the recent outcry, a spokesperson at the DHS has explained
to multiple news outlets that the Notice is not new policy.18 Joanne Talbot,
the DHS spokesperson, explained that the Notice is actually “an effort [by
the DHS] to be more transparent.”19 In an email to ARStechnica.com, Talbot
further explained that the Notice is only an amendment to a 2012 DHS policy

9 Cyrus Farivar, Congressman Demands to Know if DHS Will Collect His Social Media History,
Too,
ARSTECHNICA
(Sept.
30,
2017,
9:00
AM),
https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2017/09/congressman-demands-to-know-if-dhs-will-collect-his-social-media-history-too/; Ted.
W.
Lieu,
Letter
to
the
Honorable
Elaine
Duke
1,
1
(2017),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4063724/Letter-to-DHS-Social-Media.pdf.
10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id.

Social Media Usage in the United States - Statistics & Facts, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/topics/3196/social-media-usage-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Apr. 17,
2018).
13

14

See id.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Id.

See Fariviar, supra note 9; Joel Rose, Federal Plan To Keep Files Of Immigrant Social Media
Activity
Causes
Alarm,
NPR
(Sept.
30,
2017,
5:00
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/09/30/554557044/federal-plan-to-keep-files-of-immigrant-social-mediaactivity-causes-alarm.
18

19

Rose, supra note 18.
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titled Privacy Policy for Operational Use of Social Media.20 Talbot also
explained that “[t]he Federal Register Notice states that previously captured
information from any social media checks that took place up to naturalization
will remain in the naturalized citizens [sic] Alien File, otherwise known as
the A File. By law, USCIS will not continue to check the social media
accounts of naturalized citizens.”21 This clarification may reflect alleged
internal protocol, but it seemingly contradicts the explicit language within
the Notice.
As the DHS spokesperson’s comments emphasized, the language in the
Notice is extremely important to the overall comprehension of the new
policy. Unfortunately, the language in the Notice is convoluted and difficult
to follow.22 The most concise summary of the new policy to be implemented
can be found in the Notice section titled “I. Background.”23 This section
neatly explains that the “DHS is updating the DHS/USCIS/ICE/CBP-001
Alien File, Index, and National File Tracking System of Records to include
the following substantive changes.”24 The Notice then lists 12 changes.25
Provision (5) of the list explains that the DHS will now “expand the
categories of records to include country of nationality; country of residence;
the USCIS Online Account Number; social media handles, aliases, associated
identifiable information, and search results.”26 It is this new policy that has
sparked the public outcry.
The DHS should promptly halt the collection of immigrant social media
information. This Comment addresses the new DHS policy as follows. Part
II below sets the stage, introducing the background information necessary to
comprehend the issue. Part III begins the analysis, delving deeper into the
many issues associated with the new DHS policy. Part IV concludes, settling
the case against the Federal collection of immigrant social media
information.

20 Farviar, supra note 9; see generally DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY POLICY FOR
OPERATIONAL
USE
OF
SOCIAL
MEDIA
1
(2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Directive_11001_Privacy_Policy_for_Operational_Use_of_Social_Media_0.pdf.
21

Farviar, supra note 9.

22

See DHS Notice, supra note 1.

23

Id. at 43,557.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 44,357–58.

26

Id. at 43,557.
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

Social Media Use and Privacy

As the internet grows, communication on the web has become extremely
common. Essentially all of our communication takes place via the internet.
Unsurprisingly, social media has become the bedrock of American culture.27
In 2016, researchers determined that nearly 80% of online Americans use
Facebook, with another 24% utilizing Twitter.28 With so many social media
users, exactly how private are these modern modes of communication?
United States courts have found that information posted to social media
is not as private as a user may assume.29 In People v. Harris, the New York
Criminal Court recently explained that Twitter posts are not considered
private information.30 The court reiterated that any information released to a
third-party should not be construed as private communication.31 The court
reasoned:
If you post a tweet, just like if you scream it out the window,
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. There is no
proprietary interest in your tweets, which you have now
gifted to the world. This is not the same as a private email, a
private direct message, a private chat, or any of the other
readily available ways to have a private conversation via the
Internet that now exist.32
The court also explained that any posts or revelations to a third-party social
media provider, such as “Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Pinterest, or the next
hot social media application,” would not be considered private.33 This
jurisprudential concept is known as the third-party doctrine.
This third-party doctrine was originally set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland, back in 1979.34 In this seminal case, an
accused burglar was making threatening telephone calls to the victim of his

27 See generally SHANNON GREENWOOD, ANDREW PERRIN & MAEVE DUGGAN, PEW RESEARCH
CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA UPDATE 2016: FACEBOOK USAGE AND ENGAGEMENT IS ON THE RISE, WHILE
ADOPTION OF OTHER PLATFORMS HOLDS STEADY 1 (2016), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/14/2016/11/10132827/PI_2016.11.11_Social-Media-Update_FINAL.pdf.
28

Id. at 3.

29

See, e.g., People v. Harris, 36 Misc. 3d 868, 949 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012).

30

Id. at 872.

31

Id. at 872–73.

32

Id. at 874.

33

Id. at 873.

34

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
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prior crime.35 At police request, the telephone company installed what was
known as a “pen register” to track and record all dialed phone numbers
coming from the suspect’s home phone.36 The police did not obtain a warrant
for the pen register.37 The suspect argued that the police had violated his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.38
The question—whether the installation of the pen register constituted an
illegal search—hinged upon whether the suspect had a “‘legitimate
expectation of privacy’ regarding the numbers he dialed on his phone.”39
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court held that there was no “legitimate
expectation of privacy” attached to dialed telephone numbers.40 The Court
explained that when people dial telephone numbers, the telephone company
is receiving and potentially making permanent record of these numbers.41
“This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation
of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”42 The
Court further explained that the “petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical
information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its
equipment . . . [i]n so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”43 Thus, the third-party
doctrine was born. The ever important Fourth Amendment protection—the
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure—officially wilted.
The Supreme Court has never officially applied the third-party doctrine
to internet-based communication.44 Still, legal experts have developed
various theories pertaining to the application of the third-party doctrine to
online communication. One such application is known as “waiver theory.”45
Waiver theory explains that “a [social media] user consents to revealing . . .
information to the ISP and thus seemingly forfeits any protection over the
transmission. The user made a voluntary choice to sign an agreement before
opening an account, acknowledging that Facebook will hold the user’s
communications.”46 It thus follows that no Fourth Amendment protection

35

Id. at 737.

36

Id. at 737–38.

37

Id. at 737.

38

Id. at 738–39.

39

Id. at 742.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 743–44.

43

Id. at 744.

Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine Should Not
Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013).
44
45

Id. at 15–17.

46

Id. at 16–17.
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would be afforded, because internet-based communications are not afforded
an objective expectation of privacy.47
Ultimately, the third-party doctrine leaves a vast amount of information
exposed and unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. For example,
information associated with credit card transactions, phone records, and cell
phone locations would probably not be protected.48 The United States
government has been given significant leeway to collect and store
information transmitted via the internet. Both citizens and noncitizens alike
could be subject to significant data collection due to internet use, without any
legitimate constitutional redress. Almost 40 years ago, long before the
existence of the internet and social media, the Supreme Court made a decision
that time has proven unreasonable. Now that internet is so indispensable to
every aspect of modern life, governmental oversight bodies can easily justify
the collection of social media data as being in tune with the Supreme Court
jurisprudence in Smith v. Maryland.49
B.

The Language in the Notice

As previously mentioned, the Notice is lengthy, confusing, and riddled
with bullet points. It is important, however, to examine the Notice language
thoroughly. If the information contained in the Notice is truly an “effort [by
the DHS] to be [more] transparent,”50 this language is of the utmost
importance.
The Notice begins by stating that the outdated, partially paper-based AFiles system is set to be clarified and updated.51 The Notice introduces these
changes in the “Supplementary Information” section.52 This section states
that each immigrant alien has an A-File, which corresponds with their Alien
Number.53 The Notice then explains that the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) is the custodian of the A-Files system.54
This filing system is jointly contributed to by the USCIS, United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and United States Customs
and Border Protection (“CBP”).55
47

Id.

See Note, Data Mining, Dog Sniffs, and the Fourth Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 691, 691–
92 (2014).
48
49

See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).

50

Rose, supra note 18.

51

DHS Notice, supra note 1, at 43,557.

52

See id. at 43,556.

53

Id.

54

Id. at 43,557.

55

Id.
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The next section, titled “I. Background,” reiterates and further expounds
upon the policy that is to change.56 As previously mentioned, this section sets
a list of substantive changes to the current A-Files system, including the
“expan[sion] [of] categories of records to include . . . social media handles,
aliases, associated identifiable information, and search results.”57 This
section also clarifies the legality of the proposed data collection scheme.58 It
explains that because the A-Files system is a “system of records,” it is
governed by the Privacy Act of 1974.59 A system of records is defined as
“any records under the control of an agency from which information is
retrieved by the name of an individual or by some identifying number,
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual.”60 The
Privacy Act defines the term “individual” as someone “encompass[ing] U.S.
citizen[ship] and lawful permanent residents.”61
In a later section titled “Purpose(s) of the System,” the DHS explains
and attempts to justify its newly proposed policy.62 The purpose of this new
program is to create an official record of an “individual’s immigration
applications, petitions, and requests, as well as enforcement transactions as
he or she passes through the U.S. immigration process.”63 Earlier in the
Notice, the DHS explained that the USCIS, in conjunction with the DHS, is
responsible for processing “applications and petitions submitted for
citizenship, asylum, and other benefits.”64 Thus, according to the Notice, this
new A-Files system is meant to streamline the process and prevent fraudulent
applications from being granted.65
Another important section in the Notice is aptly titled “Categories of
Individuals Covered by the System.”66 Individuals covered by the system
include LPRs, naturalized United States citizens, individuals petitioning for
benefits on behalf of another, individuals acting as a guardian on behalf of a
disabled individual, individuals who receive benefits, and individuals who
are subject to enforcement provisions.67 The system also covers: anyone who
is subject to the INA and is under investigation for national security purposes;

56

Id. at 43,557–59.

57

Id. at 43,557.

58

See id.

59

See id.

60

Id. at 43,559.

61

Id. at 43,559.

62

See id. at 43,558.

63

Id.

64

Id. at 43,557.

65

Id. at 43,557–59.

66

Id. at 43,558.

67

Id.
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anyone who was investigated in the past; anyone who is suspected of having
violated any non-INA immigration provision; and anyone with information
related to certain INA violations.68 Essentially, anyone who has come in
contact with the United States immigration system is subject to the new
policy.69
Despite the overwhelming amount of information in the Notice, it also
contains some shockingly underdeveloped provisions. Specifically, it
contains no limiting language or oversight provisions. Astonishingly, the
Notice states that the information collected in the A-Files system “may be
shared with [the] appropriate Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, foreign,
or international government agencies.”70 With so much leeway being
afforded to the DHS, the lack of restraint associated with this new
governmental policy is extremely evident and troublesome.
C.

Legal Authorities Protecting Citizen Data from Government
Intrusion

It is clear that the United States government has granted itself a lot of
freedom to monitor. Still, there are some privacy protections in place
designed to protect against government overreach. Unfortunately, these
protections are mostly inadequate, and do not stop the United States
government from monitoring immigrants. Relevant United States domestic
legislation and international privacy protections are examined below.
1.

Amendment IV to the United States Constitution

In the United States, one of the most sacred and revered protections
against unwarranted governmental intrusion is embedded in the
Constitution.71 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.72
68

Id.

69

See id.

70

Id. at 43,558.

71

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

72

Id. (emphasis added).
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The Fourth Amendment features very specific language written centuries
ago—long before the existence of Facebook or Twitter. The question thus
becomes, will this language protect the social media information of
immigrants in today’s modern society?
Courts have wrestled with this question and reached puzzling
conclusions. In United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, the Seventh Circuit
examined the Fourth Amendment’s usage of the words “the people,” in an
attempt to determine if noncitizens are afforded Fourth Amendment
protections.73 The court applied the Verdugo-Urquidez Supreme Court
rationale and concluded that, for Fourth Amendment protections to apply, an
alien must show “‘substantial connections’ with [the United States].”74
Further, the Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe simply stated that, “an alien is
surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term.”75 When surveillance
occurs within the United States, the assumption is that the associated
“person” is entitled to Fourth Amendment protections, whereas outside the
United States the reverse is the case.76 Even immigrant aliens within the
United States would seemingly be granted Fourth Amendment protections as
“persons.”77
However, as explained above, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland
set forth the third-party doctrine, essentially whittling away Fourth
Amendment protections as applied to data collected via a third-party.78 The
Court explained that despite some subjective expectations,third-party
facilitated communications are private, andthere isno objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy.79 Until the Supreme Court is presented with a chance
to rescind the third-party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment will not protect
internet-based communications.80
2.

The Privacy Act of 1974 and E-Government Act of 2002

In a subsequent email sent to ARStechnica.com, DHS spokesperson
Joanne Talbot attached a declassified presentation titled “DHS Social Media

73

See 798 F.3d 664, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2015).

74

Id. at 670 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)).

75

457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).

See Francesca Bignami & Giorgio Resta, Human Rights Extraterritoriality: The Right to
Privacy and National Security Surveillance (2018), GWU LAW SCHOOL PUBLIC LAW & LEGAL THEORY
RESEARCH PAPER SERIES No. 2017-67 (forthcoming Sept. 2017).
76

77

See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210.

78

See 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).

79

See id. at 740.

80

See id. at 743–44.
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Update.”81 Talbot explained that “[t]he attached presentation will help you
understand how [the] DHS uses its already-in place social media policy.”82
The presentation, dated December 5, 2016, was released internally by the
DHS privacy office.83 On the slide titled “Legal Authorities,” one bullet states
that there are “[n]o explicitly worded authorities regarding social media.”84
However, the last bullet on this slide states that “[s]tatutes such as the EGovernment Act of 2002 and the Privacy Act of 1974 create privacy
protection for individuals whose information is being used and stored by the
government.”85
The Notice also refers directly to the Privacy Act of 1974.86 This Act
was passed after the Watergate scandal, at a time when Congress was
concerned about illegal surveillance and computer-stored information.87 The
Privacy Act controls the collection of data stored in a “system of records” by
the government.88 The Act has four main policy objectives:
1. To restrict disclosure of personally identifiable records
maintained by agencies.
2. To grant individuals increased rights of access to agency
records maintained on them.
3. To grant individuals the right to seek amendment of
agency records maintained on themselves upon a showing
that the records are not accurate, relevant, timely, or
complete.
4. To establish a code of ‘fair information practices’ which
require agencies to comply with statutory norms for
collection, maintenance, and dissemination of records.89

81

Fariviar, supra note 9.

82

Id.

83

See id.

DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS SOCIAL MEDIA UPDATE
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4065386/DPIAC-Social-Media.pdf.
84
85

Id.

86

See DHS Notice, supra note 1.

1,

Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, JUSTICE INFORMATION
https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1279 (last updated Aug. 16, 2013).
87

4

(2016),

SHARING,

88 About the Privacy Act, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/foia/aboutprivacy-act (last visited Apr. 16, 2018).
89

Privacy Act of 1974, supra note 87.
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The Privacy Act also requires that the public be informed via a System of
Records Notice (“SORN”) published in the Federal Register.90
Following the Privacy Act of 1974, Congress passed the E-Government
Act of 2002, attempting to cope with the rapidly changing dynamics of the
internet.91 This Act mandates that all federal agencies must create Privacy
Impact Assessments (“PIAs”) when implementing new “technology that
collects, maintains, or disseminates personally identifiable information . . . ,
or for a new aggregation of information that is collected, maintained, or
disseminated using information technology.”92 Assumedly, the Notice
complies with this E-Government Act.
3.

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986

In 1986, the United States government passed the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”).93 The passage of this Act was
another attempt by Congress to prevent “unauthorized government
surveillance of electronic communications.”94 This Act only shielded the
popular electronic communication of that era.95 More specifically, the Act
made it illegal for the government to wiretap, interfere with stored electronic
communications, and required a warrant for the deployment of a pen
register.96
Because the ECPA is full of outdated language, it is difficult to extend
its protections to modern internet-based communications. Still, the ECPA
states that the government must obtain a search warrant (supported by
probable cause) to access any stored communications less than 180 days
old.97 However, due to the obsolescence of the ECPA, protections seemingly
extend only to stored, unread emails.98 As Professor Mondu Bedi

90

Id. Note that the DHS Notice is a SORN, which is why the Notice was posted in the Federal

Register.
91 E-Government Act of 2002, Pub L. No. 347, 116 Stat. 2899 (2002); see also E-Government Act
of 2002, JUSTICE INFORMATION SHARING, https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1287 (last
updated Sept. 19, 2013).
92

Id.

Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2018); see also Bedi,
supra note 44, at 31.
93
94

Bedi, supra note 44, at 31–32.

95

Id. at 32.

96

Id.

97

See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2018).

98

Bedi, supra note 44, at 33–34.
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summarizes, “most . . . [social media] communications will not receive
SCA99 protection.”100
4.

International Privacy Safeguards

Aside from these various, mostly faltering domestic privacy protections,
some international protections exist. Unfortunately, these protections are
more conceptual than practical. Since its inception, the United Nations has
attempted to protect the human right to privacy.101 In 1948, the UN General
Assembly unanimously adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”).102 The right to privacy thus became recognized as a universal and
fundamental right.103 Article 12 of the UDHR states: “No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has
the right to protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”104
Because the UDHR was a resolution and not a binding instrument, the
UN took steps to memorialize the declaration.105 This lead to the passage of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).106 The
ICCPR is an “early” United Nations treaty, guaranteeing several civil and
political rights.107 The ICCPR was adopted in 1966.108 26 years later in 1992,
the United States formally ratified the convention.109 However, despite the
ratification, the United States attached numerous reservations,
understandings, and declarations (“RUDs”).110 Article 17, which is most
relevant to the discussion here, was not reserved against by the United
States.111

99 The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–13 (2018). Note that Stored
Communications Act is a provision (Title II) of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.
100

Bedi, supra note 44, at 33.

Lauren H. Rakower, Note, Blurred Line: Zooming in on Google Street View and the Global
Right to Privacy, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 317, 320 (2011).
101

102 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (III)
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In 2015, Human Rights Council Resolution 28/16 “directly or indirectly
confirmed that Article 17 of the ICCPR is implicated by the gathering and
processing of personal data.”112 Article 17 of the ICCPR explicitly states that
“(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his
honour and reputation. (2) Everyone has the right to protection of the law
against such interference or attacks.”113 Article 2(1) recognizes the relevant
scope of the Covenant, stating:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.114
It thus follows that communication taking place within a nation’s borders, or
communication involving a state citizen, would satisfy this scope
requirement, triggering Article 17.115
ICCPR Article 2 also relates to potential extraterritorial
communications, but not according to the United States.116 The United States
takes an extremely narrow view regarding the scope of the ICCPR.117 It is the
United States’ position that the Covenant does not reach extraterritorialbased communications.118 “According to the United States, the ICCPR’s
safeguards apply only to persons who are both within the state’s territory and
subject to the state’s jurisdiction.”119 This narrow interpretation allows and
justifies various United States surveillance programs of foreign
individuals.120

112
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III. ANALYSIS
A.

Mass Collection of Data Does Not Adequately Detect Crime

The DHS cites to several justifications for the new DHS policy.121 Its
most touted justification is that this new policy will support increased
national security—likely a result of a recent terroristic trigger.122 According
to Alex Nowrasteh, an immigration expert at the Cato Institute Center for
Global Liberty and Prosperity, the recent focus on immigrant social media
information may stem from one of the San Bernardino shooter’s laterdiscovered social media pages.123 Nowrasteh explained that this policy shift
“is another example of the government changing security protocols based on
a previous incident that will impose an enormous cost and that is of dubious
value for the future.”124 Still, research has shown that social media collection
does not adequately deter crime.125
The idea of incorporating online social media into immigration analysis
is not new.126 The DHS has revealed recent policy from 2012, which permits
the collection of immigrant social media information.127 According to
documents obtained by thedailybeast.com, the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (“USCIS”), a component of the DHS, began projects
to analyze the “publicly available social media of small groups of would-be
immigrants.”128 Documents further reveal that in 2016, USCIS created an
entire Social Media Branch dedicated to monitoring social media data
belonging to immigrants from “high risk populations.”129 In 2017, the Trump
administration approved a policy requiring social media username and profile
information for anyone applying for a United States visa.130
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The evolution of immigrant social media vetting has reached its zenith.
However, the data does not show that data collection has effectively
prevented any national security threats or denied admissions to any
dangerous peoples.131 According to a report released by the Office of the
Inspector General, the DHS’s social media monitoring programs do not
contain the requisite criteria for determining effectiveness.132 The report is
appropriately titled, “DHS’ Pilots for Social Media Screening Need
Increased Rigor to Ensure Scalability and Long-term Success,” and
recommends that the DHS implement a plan to include measurable quality
standards in their collection programs.133 The DHS concurred with the
findings, and set forth a four-prong approach to meet the report’s
recommendations.134 Thereafter, the DHS dismissed the issue, claiming that
the problem was rectified.135
Additionally, social media collection programs have not been shown to
prevent any dangerous immigrants from entering the United States.136
Immigration analyst Alex Nowrasteh argues that “[s]ocial media has been
used by immigration courts for years but there is very little evidence that it’s
helped with visa vetting.”137 Shockingly, his claims are substantiated by
internal White House documents.138 These briefing documents, provided to
then president-elect Donald Trump and his transition team, stated that the
collection and analysis of refugee social media did not yield any successful
results.139 Excerpts of the White House documents explain that the first three
“Refugee Pilots” were able to link applicants to their respective social media
accounts.140 However, the information gleamed from these accounts “did not
produce clear links to national security concerns even for applicants who
were found to pose a potential national security threat.”141 According to the
131
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information in the documents obtained by thedailybeast.com, “[a]s of
November 2016, USCIS had not denied anyone entry or legal status ‘solely
or primarily because of information uncovered through social media
vetting.’”142
The language in the Notice, as applied to these findings, should
highlight the inadequacies of this new DHS policy. First, the federal
government has conducted programs implementing similar policy, yielding
no positive result.143 Because social media has become such an integral part
of modern communication, storing “social media handles, aliases, associated
identifiable information, and search results,”144 will not effectively pinpoint
valuable information. Recent history has shown this. There is simply too
much information. The language in the Notice is not precise enough to meet
its objective.
The Notice attempts to justify mass data collection by explaining that
“USCIS . . . supports national security by preventing individuals from
fraudulently obtaining immigration benefits and by denying applications
from individuals who pose national security or public safety threats.”145 The
United States has historically used national security as a reason to impede
upon and minimize several human rights—especially the right to privacy.146
The protection of human rights is extremely important. Professor William
Burke-White argues that there seems to be an “observed correlation between
systematic human rights violations and interstate aggression.”147 Thus, using
security-centric language to justify the degradation of American rights may
actually be a telling factor indicating a propensity for extraterritorial
violence.148
It follows that the policy in question, the collection and storage of
immigrant social media information in the DHS A-Files system, will not
adequately prevent dangerous individuals from entering the United States
because the past use of similar programs has been largely unsuccessful. The
language in the Notice is also too lax and provides the DHS with
unconstrained oversight powers. The DHS should stop the collection of
immigrant “social media handles, aliases, associated identifiable
information, and search results.”149 At the very least, the Notice language and
142
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143
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corresponding DHS policy would need to be made more specific, in order to
successfully deter dangerous individuals from entering the United States.
B.

Controversial Constitutionality

In theory, the third-party doctrine allows the DHS to collect social media
information without a warrant and without any Fourth Amendment
considerations.150 However, this doctrine is controversial and antiquated.151
The DHS explained in the Notice that it is collecting and storing immigrant
“social media handles, aliases, associated identifiable information, and
search results.”152 The citizenship status of the immigrants (or
nonimmigrants) would not matter.153 The third-party doctrine totally removes
internet-based data collection from Fourth Amendment scrutiny.154
The third-party doctrine stemmed from the 1979 Supreme Court “pen
register” case, Smith v. Maryland.155 The Court held that an individual could
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when information was
transmitted via a third-party.156 This case, which was decided almost 40 years
ago, has changed Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the United States.
Now, no Fourth Amendment protections are afforded to any internet-based
or electronic communication.157 Even though many internet users do believe
that their communications are confidential or that their search results are
hidden, the Court has ruled that this expectation is not “reasonable.”158
Unsurprisingly, the third-party doctrine is highly controversial and often
contemplated by legal scholars.159
There has been some modern pushback to this third-party doctrine.
Recently, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) requested that Apple assist the
Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) in accessing the
password/encryption protected iPhone of one of the San Bernardino

150

See 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).

Matthew D. Lawless, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records and the Case
for a “Crazy Quilt” of Fourth Amendment Protection, 11 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2, 8 (2007).
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shooters.160 Apple refused to comply.161 Ultimately, the FBI employed the
help of an anonymous hacker to gain access to the contents of the encrypted
iPhone.162 Even though the Fourth Amendment was not directly implicated,
this situation brought the importance of data privacy to the limelight. As
Apple CEO Tim Cook explained, circumventing iPhone encryption at the
government’s request would create a dangerous precedent—even more
dangerous than the third-party doctrine.163
Many scholars recognize the inherent problems associated with the
third-party doctrine. Professor Stephen E. Henderson writes that this
controversial doctrine is “fundamentally misguided.”164 Professor Henderson
illustrates this by exploring a modern, online book shopping experience.165
He describes, “today if I want to purchase a book I am likely to do so online,
where not only the bookstore, but also my Internet service provider and
payment provider will make personal records.”166 He continues, “these
records are stored in a digital format that permits, once an architecture has
been established, essentially costless searching and distribution . . . [n]othing
in the Fourth Amendment prohibits such a bookstore, or any other third party,
from conveying information to law enforcement on its own initiative.”167
This example illustrates the consequences and dangers of the third-party
doctrine, as applied to a simple, noncriminal online shopping experience.
There are clear lines drawn when it comes to data privacy and
Constitutionality. As applied to the DHS Notice, any individual who wishes
to visit (or immigrate to) the United States could have search histories,
Twitter rants, YouTube binges, and Facebook profile information stored in
their Alien File.168 This encourages anonymous online activity and password
protected, encrypted hard drives. The Fourth Amendment has been stretched
in favor of the United States government, under the guise of national security.
But opposite result is likely—internet savvy individuals subject to the INA
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161
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may attempt to avoid ending up in databases that could decrease their chances
of admission to the United States.
Ultimately, the third-party doctrine is an outdated jurisprudential
mishap. The only way to rectify this mishap is to bring a case to the Supreme
Court to potentially rescind the doctrine. Only then would citizens, and
certain noncitizens alike, have their Fourth Amendment privacy protections
restored. At this moment, the constant collection and storage of internetbased information by the DHS is technically constitutional. Despite this
controversial constitutionality, negative social repercussions are likely to
follow if the DHS continues to collect immigrant social media information.
C.

Violation of International Law

There are also certain international privacy protections that may shield
some information from government surveillance. Article 17 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) states that,
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy.”169 The United States has signed and ratified the ICCPR, and has not
entered any RUDs against Article 17.170 The DHS’s social media collection
policy violates this provision of the ICCPR.171 Despite this violation,
international law does not provide a practical pathway to halt the enforcement
of the new DHS policy.172
Unfortunately, when an aggrieved individual seeks redress under the
ICCPR they face limited options.173 Despite not having a judicial
enforcement mechanism, the ICCPR “has instead an oversight and
complaints-handling body in the form of the Human Rights Committee”
(“UNHRC”).174 The United States has stifled this procedure by not signing
the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, the document creating the Human
Rights Committee.175 Despite the influence of the UNHRC, their decisions
are not binding under international law.176 Still, the UNHRC has previously
challenged the legality of mass surveillance programs, such as the (Edward

169
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Snowden-uncovered) NSA surveillance program, as being incompatible with
Article 17 of the ICCPR.177
In 1988, the Human Rights Committee released a general comment on
Article 17 of the ICCPR, titled “CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17
(Right to Privacy) The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and
Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation.”178 This
comment explains the responsibilities of states to implement the privacy
protections required by Article 17 of the ICCPR.179 For instance, in the very
first paragraph the comment states that “[t]he [privacy] obligations imposed
by this article require the State to adopt legislative and other measures to give
effect to the prohibition against such [governmental] interferences and
attacks as well as to the protection of this [privacy] right.”180 The privacy
protection laws in the United States are inadequate, as evidenced by the
federal DHS policy.
Unsurprisingly, the United States views the scope of ICCPR very
narrowly. The United States interprets ICCPR protections to extend only to
individuals already within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.181
This viewpoint justifies surveillance and data collection on foreign
immigrants.182 As legal scholar Francesca Bignami argues, this narrow
interpretation is not correct, in light of the language within the ICCPR.183
Covenant protections cover a person when they are within the “effective
control” of a state actor, not just within the territory of the state.184 Because
the Notice states that individuals subject to the INA are to have their data
collected and stored, ICCPR protections should be triggered. The ICCPR
codifies the universal right to privacy, not just a territorial one.185
Since there are no binding international judicial remedies, not much can
be done. The only semi-realistic option that foreign states could select is the
application of political pressure against the United States. The international
community would have to explicitly condemn the actions of the United States
and the DHS policy. First and foremost, the UN General Assembly and
Human Rights Committee ought to condemn the DHS policy as incompatible

177
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with the provisions in the ICCPR.186 However, due to the complex
international political atmosphere, it is unlikely that any political pressure
will be applied at this time.
The European model of understanding the international right to privacy
should provide the United States with better guidance to avoid implementing
policies that may infringe upon this right. The European Convention of
Human Rights (“ECHR”) and the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECtHR”) provide EU states with greater privacy safeguards and remedies,
compared to the United States.187 Specifically, Article 8 of the ECHR titled
the “Right to respect for private and family life,” states that: “(1) Everyone
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.”188 The second provision of Article 8 explains that:
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.189
Despite this caveat, the ECtHR has ruled that mass surveillance programs
must be particularized.190 The ECtHR has ruled that mass surveillance
operations are not compatible with the right to privacy, as encapsulated in the
ECHR.191 The United States should respect the international right to privacy,
as a party to the ICCPR, and implement safeguards akin to the understandings
in the ECHR.
The DHS social media collection policy (specified in the Notice)
violates Article 17 of ICCPR. The United States has failed to properly
implement domestic legislation protecting the universally recognized right to
privacy. The United States is at odds with the international consensus on this
matter, and should promptly end the newly implemented DHS social media
186 Id. at 6 (citing U.N. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Fourth
Periodic Report of the United States of America 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014)).
187
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collection policy. If the United States refuses to do so, there are no viable
international judicial remedies to reconcile this violation—aside from certain
political condemnations.
D.

Modern Issues with Social Media and Identity

As above-mentioned, global social media use is at an all-time high.
Theoretically, in America and abroad, nearly everyone has utilized social
media in one form or another. In 2017, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg
exclaimed that his social media platform now hosts over two billion
people.192 Within this vastness of social media, usership and content
problems are issues that are not considered by the new DHS policy and
Notice. These problems put immigrants at risk of being unfairly denied
entrance to the United States—at no fault of their own.
The first striking issue, that could seriously alter admissions and denials
to the United States, is social media-based identity theft. According to
reports, in the year 2016, social media identity fraud was up an astonishing
57%.193 According to the fraud prevention service Cifas, “Facebook, Twitter,
and LinkedIn . . . [have] become a ‘hunting ground’ for identity thieves.”194
When identity thieves have obtained stolen (or even public) information from
an individual, they have the tools to create fake social media profiles.195 The
content on these fake profiles could then get swept up and stored in an
immigrant’s DHS A-File system.
Similarly, a social media profile may also be accessed by an
unauthorized third party or “hacker.” Any information posted under the guise
of the original account owner could be stored and archived in an A-File.
According to The University of Phoenix researchers, “[n]early two in three
U.S. adults who have social media profiles say they . . . [were] aware that
their accounts . . . [had] been hacked.”196 There have been numerous recent
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high-profile hacking incidents.197 Some hackers can even gain access to
entire populations of users, compiling user credentials and auctioning them
off to the highest bidder.198 This exact situation has affected every major
social media site, including Facebook, Twitter, Myspace, and LinkedIn.199
Social media security issues have arisen time and time again. The DHS
Notice does not specify any procedure for determining the validity of the
collected and stored social media information.200
Hackers continue to have a keen interest in accessing social media
accounts. Modern hackers often utilize a hacking method known as “spear
phishing.”201 Spear phishing occurs when a bot social media account, posing
as a real person, sends a malicious link to an unsuspecting social media
user.202 Hackers can blend their bots in with other legitimate accounts, and
even assume the identity of a target account’s friends or acquaintances.203
These attacks have become so prominent and effective that the United
States government has taken note of the severity of the situation.204
According to a Time magazine report, “a Russian-led cyberattack tried to
spear phish 10,000 Twitter accounts belonging to Defense Department
employees, using personal messages targeted at specific users.”205 Once an
account is compromised and hackers have acquired personal information and
passwords, the hacker can assume the stolen identity, or sell the information
to the highest bidder. The DHS Notice does not provide any protections for
situations where a social media account is compromised. The DHS Notice
presumes that all social media activity is legitimate, and would purportedly
sweep up and permanently store all information connected to a target
individual.
There may also be issues with specific social media platforms, as
applied to the DHS Notice. Again, the Notice specifies that “social media
handles, aliases, associated identifiable information, and search results” are
to be collected and stored. 206 Despite this seemingly broad language, each
197 See Selena Larson, The Hacks That Left Us Exposed in 2017, CNN BUS. (Dec. 20, 2017, 9:11
AM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/12/18/technology/biggest-cyberattacks-of-the-year/index.html.
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social media platform has unique characteristics. For instance, Twitter
features a unique ability for a user to “retweet” content that was originally
posted by a different user.207 Many Twitter users have even gone as far as
adding a disclaimer to their profile, exclaiming that “RTs [retweets] do not
equal endorsements.”208 Will retweeted information be added to an A-File?
Will a tweet that is “liked” or “favorited” by the user negatively impact
someone looking to travel to the United States? Unsurprisingly, the DHS
Notice does not answer any of these questions.
The DHS Notice does not consider many unique issues associated with
social media. Thus, this new DHS policy could unfairly affect people who
are not as technologically savvy as others. The policy, as understood by the
language in the Notice, is simply not particularized enough. Therefore, the
DHS should halt this policy, and consider the problems associated with
modern social media usage.
E.

Relevant User-Submitted Comments

As is customary with all notices posted in the Federal Register,
interested individuals have the ability to submit comments on the proposed
new policy. The Notice comment period began on September 18, 2017 and
ended on October 18, 2017.209 During this time, almost 3,000 comments were
submitted. Most of these submitted comments present compelling arguments
against the implementation of the DHS data collection policy. Several of
these comments will be highlighted herein.
Andrew Sellars, the director of the Boston University/Massachusetts
Institute Technology (“MIT”) and Cyberlaw Clinic, submitted a comment on
behalf of students and faculty at MIT.210 Sellars summarizes the comment by
stating that:
The Commenters are all students and scholars of Internet
communications and related technologies, and write
specifically to inform DHS of the critical shortsightedness of
this planned expansion, to explain why a sound academic
would never propose such a system of information
collection, and to emphasize why such collection inherently
207 See Anne Johnson, The Ethics of Retweeting and Whether it Amounts to Endorsement, NPR
(July 31, 2014, 5:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/ombudsman/2014/07/31/336921115/the-ethicsof-retweeting-and-whether-it-amounts-to-endorsement.
208
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violates the Fair Information Practice Principles that this
agency has adopted.211
First, Sellars argues that the Notice is not clear enough, making it
impossible to determine what kind of information would be collected and
stored.212 Sellars also points out that the only person who is unable to access
the A-Files database is the subject themselves.213 Sellars contends that this is
incompatible with the Privacy Act of 1974.214
Sellars’s second main argument is that a broad collection scheme is too
unprincipled to actually catch any dangerous content.215 Sellars explains that
the “[t]he ease of development of social media means that there is a plethora
of fake and misleading accounts online, which can easily portray an
individual as something they are not.”216 Sellars explains that he is worried
that “[s]uch a system will . . . experience a sea of false negatives and false
positives.”217 Many of Sellars’s positions support the arguments proffered
herein.
Another compelling comment was submitted by Catherine Martinez and
111 other members of the Yale Law School community.218 This comment is
critical of the proposed DHS rule, “urg[ing] DHS to rescind the rule.”219 The
comment first argues that the proposed DHS rule violates the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.220 The commenters argue that
because the policy indirectly limits access and use of internet speech, the First
Amendment is violated.221 “[T]he Proposed Rule threatens to chill
individuals’ ability to exercise their rights to freedom of speech and
association on social media.”222
Later in their impressive comment, the Yale commenters argue that the
proposed DHS policy violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.223 They
argue that because the proposed policy is to collect the social media
information of naturalized citizens, it is impermissibly classifying citizens
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“on the basis of national origin.”224 “By allowing the DHS to collect this
information about naturalized citizens while excluding natural-born citizens,
this policy conditions its application to citizens on the basis of national origin,
and therefore is inherently suspect.”225 They then argue that this
discrimination is not supported by the necessary compelling governmental
interest, and that the policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.226
Thus, according to these Yale commenters, the policy violates the Equal
Protection guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.227
The above comments are just a few of the unique and convincing
arguments presented by concerned individuals. The clear majority of the
comments submitted express extreme distrust and condemnation towards the
DHS policy outline in the Notice. Many of these complex, creative, and
compelling comments have attacked the policy in every way imaginable. The
DHS policy is clearly problematic, prompting an enormous public outcry.
The resistance against the DHS policy is clear, and the DHS should halt the
now-implemented policy until these concerns are addressed.
IV. CONCLUSION
The DHS Notice is an example of the powerful internet data oversight
powers the United States government has reserved for itself. The internet has
evolved to such a point that outdated legislation does not adequately protect
the American people from constant surveillance. Supreme Court
jurisprudence is also being used to assist the government in its spying
operations.228 The United States government is in no hurry to provide its
people with more adequate protections—especially at a time when
hypervigilant safety-based paternalism is at its peak. Instead, the government
is targeting vulnerable immigrant populations, ramping up its data-collection
operations while carefully broadcasting the policy to the world. Under
existing domestic law, this collection is perfectly legal.
We are now at a crossroad. The current legal situation—surrounding the
governmental collection of internet-based information—is remarkably lax.
Even though the DHS policy is proposed to track immigrant internet data,
citizen data does not feature any increased protections. Most people have
never heard of the third-party doctrine, and are simply unaware that their

224

Id.

225

Id.

226

Id. at 10–11.

227

Id. at 11.

228

See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).

540

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 13:513

online activity is ripe for governmental surveillance. To rectify this legal
inadequacy, increased data protections must be created and implemented by
the American legislature or judiciary. Nevertheless, for reasons mentioned
herein, the United States government should discontinue the collection and
storage of immigrant social media information.

